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Abstract: 
We study how distress-oriented hedge funds (vulture funds) play an important role in the 
fresh start valuation of firms emerging from Chapter 11 reorganization. We find that loan-
to-own vultures acquire debt positions of the distressed firm that grant dominant power in 
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expense of other claim holders.  
 
Keywords: distress, bankruptcy, valuation, hedge fund, reporting discretion. 
JEL: G14, G23, G33, M41 
 
Acknowledgments: the authors appreciate the valuable comments received from the participants at 
the 2017 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Conference, 2017 Southern African Finance 
Association Conference, 2015 Financial Management Association Annual Meeting, 2015 Canadian 
Academic Accounting Association Annual Meeting, 2015 European Finance Association Annual 
Meeting, the 2014 European Accounting Association Annual Meeting, the 2014 Workshop on 
Empirical Research in Financial Accounting, and from seminar participants at the University of 
Miami, INSEAD, and Bocconi University. This study was supported by the Foundation for Science 
and Technology of Portugal (grant PTDC/IIM-GES/3933/2012).  
2 
 
Vulture Funds and the Fresh Start Accounting Value of Firms Emerging 
from Bankruptcy 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Active hedge funds have an important role in the resolution of Chapter 11 
bankruptcies. They can influence the reorganization negotiations and shift control rights in 
their favor (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997; Kahan and Rock, 2009; Jiang et al., 2012; Lim, 
2015; Ivashina et al., 2016). However, how distress-oriented hedge funds achieve that 
influence is unclear. While finance research underlines the positive effects of hedge fund 
involvement (e.g., quick recovery from bankruptcy, greater debt reduction, and more 
efficient contracting, Lim, 2015), legal studies argue that distressed-oriented hedge funds 
(known as vulture funds) obtain excessive control at the expense of other stakeholders 
(Baird and Rasmussen, 2010; Harner, 2011; Harner et al., 2014). We focus on vulture funds 
that pursue a loan-to-own strategy in which the fund purchases distressed debt with the 
intention of converting it into equity of the emerging firm; we add to this debate by showing 
a particular accounting mechanism that vulture investors are likely to use to preferentially 
influence the value of the firm at emergence from Chapter 11: fresh start (FS) accounting 
valuation.1 The FS value is important for the allocation of rights because it determines the 
value of the new firm to be divided among various stakeholders. The estimate of FS value 
affects the bankruptcy negotiations on the amounts and form (i.e., cash, new debt, or new 
equity) of the distributions to the claimants, which in turn determines the approval of the 
reorganization plan by the court and ultimately the success of the reorganization. 
                                                            
1 Statement of Position No. 90-7, Financial Reporting by Entities in Reorganization under Bankruptcy Code, 
the AICPA guidance on reorganizations included in the Accounting Standards Codification Topic 852, set the 
rules for applying fresh start accounting. It requires that entities emerging from Chapter 11 must adopt fresh 
start accounting as of the effective date of the reorganization plan if both of the following conditions are met: 
(1) the reorganization value of the emerging entity is less than the total amount of all postpetition liabilities 
plus all allowed prepetition liabilities, and (2) prepetition voting shareholders receive less than 50% of the 
voting shares in the new entity.  
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Fresh start accounting rules require that all assets of the reorganized firm are 
measured based on estimates of fair value, and recorded as opening balances in the firm’s 
financial statements upon emergence from Chapter 11.2 Because most assets are not actively 
traded in liquid markets (e.g., intangible assets, property) their fair values are based on 
forecasts rather than on arm’s-length transactions which gives rise to considerable reporting 
discretion. The forecasts of fresh start values are produced by management with the help of 
experts, and as a result, incorporate managers’ private information and the interests of 
influential claimants (Franks and Torous, 1989; Gilson et al., 2000; Lehavy, 2002). Thus, 
the discretion facilitated by FS accounting rules opens the possibility for influence over 
valuation by claimants with a significant say over the restructuring process. 
Vulture funds can obtain that significant influence by acquiring a critical position in 
the debt structure of the distressed firm: the fulcrum debt. The fulcrum is the point in the 
firm’s capital structure at which the value of the firm on exiting bankruptcy first fails to 
cover outstanding claims (Moyer et al., 2012). Fulcrum creditors have maximum voting 
power in the reorganization plan that defines the fresh start accounting value of the firm. 
The reason for this power is that while the most senior (unimpaired) creditors are paid in 
full and hence their approval of the plan is automatic, the intermediate fulcrum creditors 
which are only partially paid have a presumptive right to the equity of the newly organized 
firm. Any claims junior to the fulcrum get little or nothing in the new firm and so it is 
assumed they will reject the plan, making their vote less critical. Thus the vote of the fulcrum 
creditors is the only one that matters.  
However, the exact fulcrum point is not known until the final reorganization plan is 
approved by the court. This uncertainty gives vulture investors incentives to influence the 
                                                            
2 Under FSA rules, firms emerging from Chapter 11 are required to estimate and report the fair values of assets 
and liabilities of the reorganized entity. The amounts of the assets and liabilities of the predecessor firm are 
set to zero and the new fair values (i.e. fresh start values) are reported in the successor’s accounts. For a 
comprehensive example of fresh start accounting see Lehavy and Udpa (2011). 
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FS valuations so that the final value of the firm guarantees them increased control rights at 
exit from bankruptcy. For example, if their claim is of relatively high seniority and the FS 
value is too high, they will only receive the honoring of the claim with no opportunity to 
convert it into equity. Thus, we argue that a vulture fund acquiring a relatively high seniority 
claim has a strong preference for lower FS values because the lower priority debtors then 
receive little or no share in the equity of the emerging firm, while the vulture fund ends up 
with a larger proportion of the equity. If in fact the firm value a short time after bankruptcy 
is significantly higher than the FS value on the emerging date then there is a potential 
windfall for the owners of the emerging firm. An immediate consequence of this strategic 
influence over FS value is the cancellation of the interests of the original shareholders and 
junior debtholders. On the other hand, if vulture funds acquire debt of relatively low 
seniority, they will favor higher FS valuations to avoid the risk of extinguishing the claim 
and to ensure that the claim is partially rather than fully impaired. The case of Visteon which 
filed for Chapter 11 in May 2009 illustrates how vultures can strategically interfere with FS 
valuation. Some vulture investors bought a large portion of unsecured junior debt with 
almost zero recovery value in the initial reorganization plan. They voted against the initial 
plan and the court had to overrule it. The plan was amended five times, and the estimated 
FS value changed from about $1 billion to about $2.5 billion in the final plan approved in 
October 2010. The emerging value of the firm granted vulture investors 16% ownership in 
the firm. Three months later, Visteon’s market value jumped to about $3.5 billion.  
We empirically test our conjectures for a hand-collected sample of Chapter 11 firms, 
in the period between 1994 and 2011. We start by comparing the FS value of the firm’s 
assets at exit from Chapter 11 bankruptcy (ve) with the value of assets at filing for 
bankruptcy (vf). We find that when vulture funds enter the capital structure of the target firm 
at relatively high seniority positions, the firm experiences a downward FS valuation in 67% 
of cases (i.e., ve - vf < 0). In contrast, when vulture investors hold low seniority claims, 95% 
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of the firms exit bankruptcy with upward FS valuation (i.e., ve - vf > 0). The upward 
(downward) FS valuation is mostly achieved through the increase of the fair value of 
intangible assets (i.e. decrease of fair value of property, plant and equipment).  We also 
document the FS misvaluation at emergence date measured as the difference between the 
FS value of assets and the market value of the firm (ve – vm,e). We find that the fresh start 
value is understated by 5.5% on average relatively to the market value. More importantly, 
the FS misvaluation significantly increases (i.e., the understatement is grater) with the 
presence of vulture fund investors. The multivariate analysis that controls for other factors 
affecting vulture funds’ investment decisions confirms the significant relations between the 
debt positions held by vulture funds during bankruptcy and the over or under valuation of 
the firm at exit from bankruptcy.  
Vulture funds must ensure cooperation from management to exert influence over FS 
valuation. The estimations of the fresh start value of assets are typically made by experts 
but managers retain substantial involvement in valuations because they possess better 
knowledge about the true value of the assets and they remain in control of the firm’s 
operations (Franks and Torous, 1989; Wruck, 1990; Lehavy, 2002). Creditors on the other 
hand, have little external information about the value of business and its future prospects, 
and consequently rely on management estimates as the basis to negotiate the fresh start value 
of the firm (Gilson et al., 2000). Vulture funds are known for actively controlling 
management and the board, and often take the role of CEO or chairman of the distressed 
firm (Hotckiss and Mooradian, 1997; Kahan and Rock, 2009). Managers have incentives to 
cooperate with active vultures to avoid the stigma of being associated with long or 
unsuccessful reorganizations and to increase the probability of keeping their managerial 
positions (Brav et al., 2008; Bharat et al., 2014). If the loan-to-own debtholders end up with 
significant equity interests in the newly restructured firm as our findings suggest, they will 
have great influence in the reappointment and remuneration of management ex-post the 
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bankruptcy. Alignment with the interests of fulcrum creditors can also bring management 
benefits during bankruptcy. Often senior managers experience a considerable reduction in 
wealth as their (low priority) equity share in the distressed firm is cancelled under the FS 
valuation rules. This wealth loss can be compensated by pay-to-stay remuneration plans 
offered by fulcrum creditors who are the key voting party in the reorganization. The 
incentive plans (key employee retention plans or KERPs) grant managers generous salaries 
to stay in the job and steer the firm out of Chapter 11 creating incentives for managers to 
produce creditor friendly valuations (Bharat et al., 2014).3 We provide evidence that the 
amount of management compensation during bankruptcy is four times higher in firms with 
vulture fund involvement. Further, we find that, in the presence of vulture funds, 
management compensation is lower when there is a high competition for management 
attention (proxied by the number of voting classes), an indication that vultures have less 
scope for alignment of management interests with their own when they have relatively less 
bargaining power in the negotiations.  
We perform several additional tests. First, we observe the market value of the firm 
12 months after bankruptcy and compare it with the FS value of the firm at emergence. A-
priori, when a Chapter 11 firm emerges from bankruptcy, it is no surprise if the market value 
increases rapidly. However what would be surprising is to systematically observe 
inconsistency between the FS value estimated by management and the actual market value 
soon after bankruptcy. Valuation inconsistency arises when large downward FS valuations 
are systematically followed by large increases in subsequent market values. This reversal in 
firm value (which we refer to as whiplash) suggests FS valuation bias. We find increasing 
levels of such reversals when vulture funds hold fulcrum claims. Considering that vulture 
investors usually purchase debt of troubled firms at a large discount (given the uncertainty 
                                                            
3 Note that vulture funds wish managers to stay during Chapter 11 to facilitate the bankruptcy. Once the firm 
exits Chapter 11 as a new company managers may leave since their role as bankruptcy facilitators becomes 
irrelevant.  
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of Chapter 11 and the lack of liquidity, creditors prefer to sell cheap than to risk receiving 
nothing in the new firm, Ivashina et al., 2016), the reversal in market values can give 
vultures the opportunity to earn large ex-post returns by trading the stock or selling the 
firm’s assets at higher market prices.  
Second, we examine the relation between vultures’ loan-to-own strategies and the 
likelihood of post-bankruptcy accounting restatements. If the undue influence of vulture 
funds is reflected in the reported FS values, we expect that a firm is more likely to formally 
restate previously filed accounting statements. We find that the probability of reporting an 
accounting restatement related with asset measurement in the year after bankruptcy is 28% 
higher when vulture funds hold high-intermediate seniority claims. We also show that the 
asset value of the subsequent restatements is substantially larger when vultures have 
incentives to depress the FS asset value of the firm. 
Vulture funds are not the only party whose interests are at stake in the restructuring 
process, so why do other stakeholders not pursue a similar loan-to-own strategy? Put simply, 
other parties lack the incentives and the means of vulture fund investors. Banks prefer a 
loan-to-loan strategy because they have incentives to strengthen the seniority and security 
of their existing loans and to provide debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing (Heron et al., 
2009; Ivashina et al., 2016; Li and Wang, 2016). Banks are also burdened by capital 
requirements which reduce opportunities for high-risk Chapter 11 investments. Other 
institutional investors, such as pension and mutual funds, are constrained by regulatory and 
structural barriers from distress investment strategies (Brav et al., 2008). For example, 
mutual funds are precluded from holding large stakes in individual companies, and pension 
funds are subject to heightened fiduciary standards and to extensive state controls. Unlike 
vulture funds, both mutual and pension funds fall under the SEC’s Investment Company 
Act 1940 which greatly limits their flexibility in trading. Other types of funds, such as 
private equity and venture capital funds, focus on private investments. In terms of 
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replicability of the vulture fund’s strategy, there is a first mover advantage for the first agents 
(timely vulture funds) that purchase the fulcrum debt. As most of the debt trades during 
bankruptcy are private and lack market oversight (e.g. low liquidity and analyst following), 
identifying potential sellers and negotiating privately to buy their claims requires specialist 
information and skills that other agents do not have (Gilson et al., 2000; Ivashina et al., 
2016). Whereas equity trades above a certain threshold are required to be disclosed, trading 
in debt is not. To the best of our knowledge the only study that has been able to get access 
debt trading of Chapter 11 firms is Ivashina et al. (2016). They find that the activist investors 
including hedge funds are the largest net buyers and trade creditors are the largest net sellers. 
Active investors also buy notes and bonds that are reported anonymously in the court 
documents as custodial holdings. One reason for specialist hedge funds being the largest net 
buyers is that many traditional fund managers and banks are precluded from trading in 
Chapter 11 securities.  
In sum, vulture investors hire highly incentivized fund managers who invest large 
sums of money in risky strategies (Gilson, 1995; Brav et al., 2008), they are not burdened 
by demanding reporting requirements and regulatory oversight (Harner, 2011), and they are 
capable of taking control over management and the board of the distressed investment 
(Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997; Li and Wang 2016). 
 Our findings contribute to understanding how important claimholders are able to 
influence the value of firms that emerge from court-supervised bankruptcy. We discuss and 
provide empirical evidence that the discretion allowed by fresh start accounting offer 
fulcrum claimants’ opportunities to introduce valuation bias. Assets values of distressed 
firms are very different from their liquidation values or market values (Kausar and Lennox 
2017), leading to significant fresh start revaluation values. Further, the FS revaluations rely 
heavily on management estimates of fair values as most assets are not actively traded in 
liquid markets. In a bankruptcy setting asset valuation requires application of subjective 
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judgement (e.g. Lehavy and Upta (2011)) which may be applied in a strategic, self-
interested fashion. We show that management compensation is one channel that fulcrum 
vulture funds may use to bias the FS revaluations during the negotiations in the desired 
direction. Our findings also add to the extensive literature on management desire to 
manipulate accounting values. A growing literature typified by Gwilliam and Jackson 
(2008) argues that attempts to move to market-based valuation have not prevented 
management or other interested parties from introducing bias in valuation. In the absence 
of liquid market prices for assets of Chapter 11 firms, the estimation of fair values based on 
forecasts potentially introduces error and management discretion (e.g. Dietrich et al., 2000). 
Our evidence suggest that relying on the assertion that fresh start accounting values are 
based on fair values estimated by independent experts and hence free of bias is problematic 
especially when interested parties have strategic reasons for bias. Finally, our study also 
adds to the debate on the nature and effects of hedge fund activism in Chapter 11 cases. We 
draw on the findings by Jiang et al. (2012), Ivashina et al. (2016), Li and Wang (2016) and 
others and explain how vulture funds can position themselves to exploit the unique features 
of FS valuation to influence the “size of the pie” allocated to various claimants.  
  The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The following section describes the 
sample and data. Section 3 discusses the methodological approach and Section 4 presents 
the empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. SAMPLE AND DATA 
2.1 SAMPLE  
To identify the firms using fresh start accounting, we start with the complete UCLA-
LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database of firms that filed under Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 
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of the Bankruptcy Code.4 This sample comprises 920 companies over the period 1980 to 
2011. It is worth noting that of the universe of financially distressed firms is only a subset 
file for Chapter 11 which reflects the fact that when a company finds itself in financial 
distress there are a number of methods to restructure (Chatterjee et al., 1996). Two of the 
most discussed methods are voluntary workout and Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Our 
research looks at Chapter 11 filings which meet the requirements of FASB ASC 852 
Reorganizations and sheds light on some specific properties of fresh start accounting. 
Hence, we exclude firms that are liquidated in Chapter 7, firms that emerged from 
bankruptcy prior to 19945, and firms not included in Compustat, Capital IQ and CRSP, and 
we end up with 375 firms. From this sample, we removed cases where the court approved 
the sale of all or almost all of the assets, thus resulting in a sample of 337 companies.  
The LoPucki database registers if the company made a fresh start filing in the field 
“FreshStartAccounting”. For the sample of 337 firms, we find “yes” in the field for 77 
companies and “no” for 16 companies, leaving 244 companies unclassified. For the 244 
unclassified firms, we search all the companies’ filings in the SEC EDGAR database for the 
phrase “Fresh Start” around the date of emergence. If we do not find the phrase, then we 
exclude the company. If we do find the phrase, we search through all the SEC filings and 
collect the associated FS accounts. We then eliminate cases for which we do not have the 
necessary financial and market data, resulting in a final sample of 127 firms that went 
through Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 1994 and 2011. Even though bankruptcy affects a 
relatively small number of firms, it has wide social, economic, and political costs and thus 
remains an important corporate event that attracts considerable research by academics and 
attention by regulators and practitioners (see for example, Jones et al., 2017). 
                                                            
4 The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database includes firms with assets worth $100 million or more 
measured in 1980 dollars as of the last 10-K filing immediately prior to filing for bankruptcy; and filed a 10-
K for the year ending not less than 3 years prior to the bankruptcy filing. 
5 In order to collect fresh start accounts, we need to be able to search the SEC EDGAR database which only 
records companies back to 1994. 
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For the 127 cases we read all the fresh start accounts and manually collect the asset value 
of the firm at filing of bankruptcy (predecessor firm) and at exit from bankruptcy (the 
successor firm). The difference between the two values is the fresh start (re) valuation. 
 
2.2 IDENTIFYING THE PRESENCE AND STRATEGY OF VULTURE FUNDS IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
There is no database identifying vulture fund investors, thus we construct a unique list by 
combining the Altman and Kuehne (2011) classification of 324 funds with the list of 258 
distressed debt funds provided by Distressed-Debt-Investing.com. We obtain a list of 399 
vulture fund investors.6  
The next step is to identify the presence of any of the 399 vulture funds in the sample 
firms and their loan-to-own strategy. To implement the strategy, the fund needs to acquire 
the class of debt that is fulcrum. However, observing the holdings of debt claims is difficult 
because there are no public records of trades during bankruptcy. Unlike regulations for 
public equity holdings, which require disclosures by insiders and owners of more than 5% 
of outstanding shares, regulations for public debt do not require disclosure of holdings or 
trades (Ivashina et al., 2016), hence vulture funds are barely required to file any documents 
when they acquire debt securities. Most deals are negotiated privately and recorded in court-
sealed documents which are not tracked by one central registry or entity. Further, even with 
access to the court documents it is difficult to obtain information on the original holders 
because many of them are hidden behind Depository Trusts that act as custodians of the 
original holders (Ivashina et al. 2016). We overcome this limitation by implementing the 
following procedure. First, we identify the fulcrum class of debt for each firm. We obtain 
                                                            
6 Of the 75 additional vulture funds identified, 45 have names similar to those in the Altman classification. 
For instance, Cerebrus Capital Management LP and Cerebus Partners are both identified as vulture funds 
and so we treat them as one. But we note that the potential double counting of funds with similar names does 
not affect our results because our statistical tests look at the total holdings of all vulture funds from the list, 
not the number of vulture funds with a holding. The list of vulture funds is available from the authors upon 
request.  
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reorganization plans provided by BankruptcyData.com which lists the classes of claims that 
are honored (unimpaired), the classes cancelled in full (impaired), and the classes partially 
impaired (the fulcrum debt). The reorganization plans provide information about the type 
and the relative seniority of the classes, but they do not identify their holders. Second, we 
conduct extensive news searches in Factiva to establish whether any of the 399 vulture funds 
has acquired the identified fulcrum security of a particular firm. We search using the 
following combination of key words: (1) firm name (2) vulture fund name and (3) the 
description of the fulcrum class obtained from the reorganization plans (e.g., “Class 4 senior 
notes claims”, “Secured class 3 debt”, “Class 7 impaired unsecured junior claims”). The 
process of manual searching and reading through Factiva documents also helps us 
understand the reorganization setting of each firm.  For example, we are able to identify 
who the other important players are, banks and funds for example, and whether there are 
disputes amongst various claimants. Third, we check whether the debt class held by a 
vulture fund is indeed swapped for equity on exit from Chapter 11. We do this by searching 
SEC filings 13D, 13D/A, 13G, 13G/A, 13F, 10K, and 8K for each firm over the period from 
six months before the bankruptcy filing to six months after emergence from bankruptcy.7 
From these filings, we collect equity ownership by vulture funds and by other important 
claimants, on the dates of entry and exit from bankruptcy. Based on this analysis, we group 
vulture funds (VF) into two types: (1) VF that purchased unsecured junior claims of a 
relatively low seniority which we call VF holding Low-Intermediate Seniority claims, and 
(2) VF that purchased secured or more senior classes of claims which we call VF holding 
High-Intermediate Seniority claims. 
                                                            
7 Investors are required to file with the SEC within 10 days of acquiring more than 5% of any class of 
securities of a publicly traded company. Investors should file schedule 13D filings (active investors) or 13G 
filing (passive investors).  Form 13F filings require all institutions that have investment discretion over a 
minimum of $100 million in Section 13(f) securities of the Securities Exchange Act to disclose their quarter-
end holdings in these securities. If the investor receives more than 5% equity interest in the reorganized firm 
over the course of Chapter 11 restructuring, then the original debt positions that vest the fund with such 
equity ownership is recorded in “Item 3: Source and Amount of Funds or Other Consideration” of the 13D 
form. 
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Since the precise fulcrum point is not known until the reorganization plan is approved by 
the court, the low-intermediate seniority claims are likely to be positioned below the fulcrum 
point while the high-intermediate seniority claims are expected to be positioned above the 
fulcrum point. Thus, we predict that vulture funds are likely actively involved in negotiating 
the fresh value of the firm, and that this negotiation is related, at least partially, with the 
relative position of their claims in the debt structure of the firm (see Figure 1 for graphical 
interpretation). In particular we anticipate that, on average: (a) VF holding low-intermediate 
seniority claims welcome upward FS valuations; and (b) VF hold high-intermediate 
seniority claims favor downward FS valuations. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Vulture funds are sophisticated investors that can select the Chapter 11 firms that best serve 
their interests and hence their targets are probably not random, but result from a deliberate 
choice correlated with unobservable conditions. To address the potential endogeneity in 
vulture investment decisions we fit the following two-stage treatment model:8 
 
ܨܵݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݅݋݊_ܾ݅ܽݏ௜ ൌ ௜ܺߚ ൅ ܸܨܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ௜ߜ ൅ ߝ௜,      
ܸܨܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃ݕ௜ ൌ ൜1,						݂݅	ܼ௜ߛ ൅ ߤ௜ ൐ 00,															݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁		       (1) 
 
The left-hand-side variable in the second stage equation is the measure of the fresh 
start (FS) valuation bias which we compute in two ways. The first (FSrevaluation) is an 
accounting-based measure calculated as the difference between the successor firm FS value 
of assets at Chapter 11 exit (ve) and the predecessor firm value of assets at Chapter 11 entry 
(vf), scaled by the book value of equity plus book value of debt after emergence. 
                                                            
8 The model is as described in Wooldridge (2002, section 15.7.3), Guo and Fraser (2009, section 4) and is 
implemented in the hedge fund literature by Jiang et al. (2012 and Lim (2015). 
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FSrevaluation takes into account that the predecessor value is an unbiased firm value known 
to vultures at bankruptcy entry point at which they decide how to negotiate valuation to turn 
their claim into a fulcrum security. In other words, based on the observed predecessor value 
vultures are likely to bias asset valuations during the negotiations in the desired direction so 
that a reached successor value ensures that their debt claims are swapped for equity. The 
second measure (FSmisvaluation) compares the FS value of assets at bankruptcy exit (ve) 
with the market value of the assets at that date (ݒ௠,௘). This measure has been used in other 
chapter 11 studies and has the advantage of comparing firm values at the same point in time 
(e.g. Lehavy, 2002; Gilson et al., 2000). Using the market value to compute the valuation 
bias implicitly assumes that market value represents an unbiased estimate of the firm’s 
intrinsic value at exit date. That assumption has limitations  because many firms do not trade 
immediately after bankruptcy or trade only over the counter; while those that do trade suffer 
from asymmetries of information due to low liquidity and low analyst coverage (e.g. Li and 
Zhong 2013; Eberhart et al. 1999). Furthermore, the first day of trading is difficult to track 
and consequently poorly recorded by commercial databases such as CRSP9.  
The key right-hand-side variable of interest is VFStrategy which takes two 
alternative definitions reflecting the two strategies explained in Section 2.2: (1) VF 
LowISeniority claims which equals one when vulture funds hold low-intermediate seniority 
debt claims, and zero otherwise; and (2) VF HighISeniority claims which takes the value of 
one when vulture funds hold high-intermediate seniority debt claims and zero otherwise.  
The set of explanatory variables included in Vector Xi are selected following prior 
literature on vulture fund participation in bankruptcy outcomes. We include variables 
representing characteristics of the bankruptcy period and variables capturing the pre-filing 
                                                            
9 Most stocks of reorganized firms do not trade immediately after emergence date, and when trading begins 
it is usually only in OTC markets and thus not recorded by CRSP. Additionally the identification of the first 
day of trading is not obvious because it varies with the particular characteristics of the new and old stock 
such as whether the new shares trade under the old name or a new name, or whether the old shares are fully 
cancelled or continue to trade. 
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conditions and accounting choices of the firm. Vector Zi includes variables that are common 
to vector Xi in the second stage equation, plus two instruments: HF distress return and Bond 
return.  HF distress return is the monthly average return over the three months before 
bankruptcy of an index of distress-investing hedge fund return and represents the supply 
conditions of hedge fund distress-investors (Jiang et al., 2012). Bond return is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the three-month average bond return of S&P500 firms 
before bankruptcy is positive and zero if it is negative. The variable captures the good and 
bad conditions in public debt markets which are likely to be associated with the supply-
demand dynamics of the distressed claims.10.  
To choose the explanatory variables (overlapping in vectors Xi and Zi), we address 
two questions. How do vulture investors decide their investment strategy? Which incentives 
of vulture funds and other players are likely to affect the outcome of the restructuring?  
Vultures typically consider whether the firm is economically healthy or the problem lies 
with the firm’s business model. We include Operating performance pre-bankruptcy to 
capture the economic strength of the target firm, measured as the average of the industry-
adjusted ratio of operating income to sales, in the year before bankruptcy filing (Lim, 2015; 
Ivashina et al., 2016).  
Vulture funds might also prefer capital intensive firms because their assets are 
relatively easy to value, and can be sold after bankruptcy at higher prices. We include 
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy measured as an indicator taking the value of one if the firm’s 
tangibility (the average of plant, property and equipment to total assets in the year before 
bankruptcy) is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 
                                                            
10By including Bond return and HF distress return as instruments (exclusion restrictions) in the first stage, 
our approach ensures that at least one component of vector Z is a unique determinant of the endogenous 
variables VFStrategy (see for example Guo and Fraser, 2009, section 4.4). Because it is unlikely that there is 
a firm-level characteristic which satisfies the exclusion restriction requirement so that it determines the 
VFStrategy without simultaneously influencing the FSrevaluation outcome, we follow the approach employed 
by Jiang et al. (2012) and choose variables capturing market-wide conditions for distress-investing hedge 
funds. We repeat the tests using S&P500 stock returns instead of bond returns, as in Jiang et al. (2012), and 
our results do not change.  
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also captures any pre-filing accounting policy that intentionally inflates the value of fixed 
assets. 
The characteristics of the firm’s capital structure are important determinants of both 
fresh start valuations and vulture investment decisions. For example, when a firm has a high 
debt-to-assets ratio, low seniority claims are more likely to fall significantly below the 
fulcrum point. In that case, vulture investors are less likely to purchase LowISeniority claims 
because junior claims risk being cancelled in full. At the same time, there is a greater 
probability that senior debt will be partially impaired in which case holding HighISeniority 
claims gives more upside potential. Debt-to-assets is also a proxy for claimants’ bargaining 
power (Lehavy, 2002). Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy is the average of the debt-to-assets 
ratio in the last year before filing for bankruptcy. We also consider the proportion of secured 
bank debt (Secured debt) measured as the average ratio of secured bank debt to total assets 
in the year prior to bankruptcy (Jostardndt and Sautner, 2009; Jiang et al. 2012; Franks and 
Loranth, 2014). As bank lenders usually follow a loan-to-loan strategy because their 
incentives are to enforce existing loans’ seniority and security (Heron et al., 2009; Li and 
Wang, 2016), other senior debt holders have less room for activism in the negotiating 
process. As a result, there is less upside potential from pursuing a HighISeniority strategy. 
High level of secured bank debt suggests that the senior debt is more likely to be under-
collateralized. The under-collateralized debt gives secured creditors incentives to promote 
the reorganization (instead of liquidation of assets) providing more upside potential for 
junior claimants and hence encouraging a LowISeniority strategy. A large portion of secure 
debt in the hands of banks also reduces coordination problems (Jostardndt and Sautner, 
2009). To account for the influence of DIP lenders in the outcomes of the reorganization, 
we add the indicator DIP financing in the second stage of the model (Elayan and Meyer, 
2001; Chatterjee et al., 2004; Bharat et al., 2014; Li and Wang, 2016). Next, we consider 
the presence of large public debt (Public debt is coded as one if a firm has above-median 
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public debt outstanding in the year before bankruptcy, and zero otherwise). We build on 
advances in the literature (Lim, 2015) showing that there are often coordination problems 
among public debt holders. In the presence of public debt outstanding, bank lenders, who 
are generally secured and senior to public debt lenders, are reluctant to engage in 
restructuring efforts or to make concessions such as extending maturities and granting new 
loans. Given vultures’ willingness to take junior public debt claims and their superior ability 
to resolve coordination problems, the presence of public debt provides them with an upside 
opportunity, particularly with a LowISeniority strategy. This argument is consistent with the 
findings of Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) and Jiang et al., (2012) of a positive market 
reaction to the purchase of public debt by vulture funds.  
There are other important players in the bankruptcy process, namely hedge funds 
that are not distress-oriented. In general, the presence of hedge funds has favorable effects 
on bankruptcy outcomes (Jiang et al., 2012; Lim, 2015). Their presence as a major equity 
holder is related with more favorable fresh start values, otherwise they would be unlikely to 
receive any payoffs. We include Presence of other hedge funds taking the value of one if at 
least one non-distress hedge fund is an equity holder during bankruptcy, and zero 
otherwise.11  
Contracting problems and frictions among claimholders affects funds' investment 
decisions and valuation outcomes (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991). We introduce the 
variable Number of claimants - number of claim classes identified in the plan of 
reorganization to represent contracting issues during bankruptcy (Gilson, 1997; Lehavy, 
2002; Jiang et al., 2012; Lim, 2015).  
                                                            
11 We search SEC filings 13D, 13G, 13F, 10K and 8K for each sample firm from six months prior to 
bankruptcy until exit from bankruptcy, to identify the equity holdings by each hedge fund in the list. We also 
looked for the presence of banks, institutional investors, and other funds as equity holders. We found very few 
cases of holdings by these investors, confirming prior findings that these investors stay away from distress 
firms. 
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We capture senior management’s incentive to cooperate with vulture investors in the 
valuation negotiations by including Management compensation which measures the total 
compensation offered to top managers during bankruptcy scaled by total assets of the 
predecessor firm multiplied by 103. We manually collect the amount of management 
compensation from the companies’ fillings. We also add to the model CEO time at 
bankruptcy, calculated as the log transformation of the number of days the CEO has served 
in the firm at the filing date (Hotchkiss, 1995; Gilson et al., 2000; Lehavy, 2002).  
Since the duration of the restructuring process is related with valuation 
disagreements among claimants (Franks and Torous, 1989), we add Bankruptcy duration 
defined as the log transformation of the number of days between the Chapter 11 filing date 
and the emerging date.12 
 Finally, we capture time and industry variation in reorganizations. Indicator Time 
is coded one if the bankruptcy filing date is in periods of high prevalence of bankruptcies 
(periods 2000-2003 and 2009-2010), and zero otherwise. Industry indicators are based on 
four industry groups.13  Table 1 provides definitions of variables.  
 
Place Table 1 here 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE  
Table 2 reports an overview of the first measure of FS valuation bias, i.e. FSrevaluation. 
We split the unscaled FS revaluation measure (successor assets – predecessor assets) into 
positive and negative cases. Firms with positive revaluations (N=62) experience a mean 
                                                            
12 We note that DIP financing, Management pay-to-stay and Bankruptcy duration are not included in the 
first stage of the model because they are granted or known only during and after the reorganization process. 
Thus, they are not ex-ante determinants of vulture funds’ investment decisions. 
13 We aggregate one-digit SIC industry indicators into four industry groups to deal with the small number of 
observations per industry.  
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increase of $875.16 million, which is mostly achieved through the increase of the fresh start 
value of goodwill and intangibles. Firms with negative revaluations (N=65) show a mean 
decrease of -$706.08 million mainly due to the write-off of PPE and to a lesser extent other 
non-current assets.  
Place Table 2 here 
 
As we are interested in how VFStrategy relates to FS valuation bias, we focus on firms with 
vulture funds presence and we split these firms by VFStrategy. In Table 3, we report mean 
and median values for the two measures of FS valuation bias, FSrevaluation (ve – vf) and 
FSmisvaluation (ve – vm,e), for firms in which vultures hold LowISeniority claims and for 
firms in which they hold HighISeniority claims. We find that out of the 21 firms in which 
vultures enter the capital structure at relatively junior positions, 20 firms exit Chapter 11 
with positive FS revaluation, whereas only 1 firm exits with a negative FS revaluation. In 
contrast, out of 39 firms in which vultures purchase senior claims about two-thirds (26) exit 
Chapter 11 with negative FS revaluations.14 The mean and median values of FSrevalution 
are positive for firms with VF holding LowISeniority claims but they are negative for firms 
with VF holding HighISeniority claims, and the difference between the two groups of firms 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. FSmisvaluation is negative for both VF strategies 
but it is more negative when vultures hold high seniority claims and hence prefer lower 
valuation. This descriptive evidence suggests that there is a link between the relative 
position of the claims that vultures acquire during bankruptcy and the firm’s fresh start value 
at the exit from bankruptcy.  
For completeness, we also report in Panel B of Table 3 the mean and median 
FSrevaluation and FSmisvaluation by vulture fund presence. Mean FSrevaluation is -0.040 
for firms with vulture fund presence and -0.308 for firms without vulture involvement, a 
                                                            
14 In the multivariate analysis we repeat our tests excluding the 3 cases where vulture funds hold both types 
of debt claims. Our results do not change. 
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result consistent with prior evidence that hedge funds' presence increases recovery rates 
(Jiang et al., 2012).15 FSmisvaluation is lower when vulture funds are involved then when 
they are not but the difference is not statistically significant.   
 
Place Table 3 here 
 
Table 4 provides univariate evidence of the link between management compensation during 
bankruptcy and the presence of loan-to-own vulture funds in Chapter 11. Management 
compensation refers to payment schemes, such as KERPs, that are offered to the 
management team to assist the valuation negotiations and help steer the business out of 
bankruptcy. The mean value of Management compensation is more than four times higher 
in firms with vulture fund presence (Panel A). This evidence suggests that management 
alignment is an important channel through which vulture investors are able to influence 
valuation negotiations. Promoting generous compensation to the agent that is responsible 
for the estimation of asset values gives vulture funds leverage to influence the valuation in 
their favor. Considering that typically management are rewarded with a mix of cash salary 
and performance related share options or warrants, when a firm files for Chapter 11, 
management face a likely wealth reduction because the share options and warrants on the 
original firm often become worthless. Thus, management will react positively to the 
opportunity to receive compensation including claims on the emerging firm. In Panel B of 
Table 4 we examine whether the compensation varies depending on the bargaining power 
and competition among negotiating parties.16 We split management compensation into 
strong and weak competition among the claimants (measured as an indicator taking the 
                                                            
15 We document a lower proportion of hedge fund involvement (50%) than in prior studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 
2012; Lim, 2015) because we study a particular type of hedge fund (vulture funds). When we consider both 
vulture funds and other hedge funds, we find hedge fund presence in 73% of cases, a proportion similar to 
that of other studies. 
16 We thank the editor and the anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
21 
 
value of one if the number of voting classes is above the sample median, and zero otherwise) 
and find that, for the cases with vulture presence, Management compensation is significantly 
higher when competition is weak.  One possible interpretation of this finding is that when 
the claimants’ competition for management influence is weak, the relative bargaining power 
of an individual creditor (i.e., an influential vulture fund) is stronger and they have more 
scope to secure attractive incentives to mangers that favor their interests.  
Place Table 4 here 
In Table 5 we compare vulture ownership at entry and exit from bankruptcy to see if vultures 
succeed in increasing their share of control rights. Vulture equity holdings increase 
substantially, both in statistical and economic terms. Vulture ownership jumps from 0.7% 
at entry to 17.9% at exit from bankruptcy. For firms in which vultures invested via 
LowISeniority claims, the equity holdings increased from 1.5% to 21.6% on average. For 
firms where vultures acquired HighISeniority claims, average equity holdings increased 
from 0.3% to 16.7%. These findings suggest that both loan-to-own strategies result in a 
significant increase in control over the new firm.  
 
Place Table 5 here 
 
We next provide two examples from our sample firms that illustrate clearly the strategic 
influence of vulture investors on bankruptcy valuations. The first case shows the pivotal 
role of vulture funds holding junior debt in the fresh start value of Six Flags (we identify 
Tricadia Capital Management, 1798 Global Partners, Fortelus Capital Management, and H 
Partners Management LLC as vulture funds).  
“At the centre of a dispute between Six Flags and competing groups of creditors is whether the 
company's current proposed reorganization plan undervalues the company, preventing some 
creditors from getting what they feel they deserve. Over the last 18 months, one of its senior 
debtholders, Avenue Capital Group, has reduced its estimates of how much the company is worth 
by about $1 billion. Six Flags filed Chapter 11 in June with a prepackaged restructuring plan that 
transferred nearly all of its stock to its bank lenders in return for cutting its debt. Since then, two 
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other creditor groups have sought to fight for control of the company. An informal bondholders 
group led by Avenue Capital has proposed a plan, now supported by the company that values the 
company at around $1.5 billion, meaning lower tier creditors would only be eligible to recover a 
4.8 percent stake in the reorganized company. A group of those lower tier creditors, known as the 
"Stark-led noteholders," asked the court earlier this month for permission to file a competing plan 
of reorganization, saying they have a better proposal that would allow them to take more control 
over the company after bankruptcy…the ad hoc group led by Stark included Credit Suisse Securities, 
Tricadia Capital Management, 1798 Global Partners, Capital Ventures International, Altai Capital 
Management, Pentwater Capital Management, Fortelus Capital Management, H Partners 
Management LLC and Bay Harbour Management LLC.” (Chasan, E. in the Reuters News, 4 
December 2009). 
 
The second case illustrates how vulture funds holding more senior debt pressure the fresh 
start value of the firm to guarantee the swap of the debt for a share of equity post-bankruptcy 
(we identify Tennenbaum Capital Partners and Bennet Management Corp. as vulture funds).  
“In August, a Bankruptcy Court in New York approved a reorganization plan that trimmed $200 
million off the company's books through a debt-for-equity swap. Under the plans terms, holders of 
$305 million in secured subordinated notes would receive $75 million of new unsecured notes and 
96% of the reorganized company's new common stock. After the swap, International Wire's largest 
shareholder is Tennenbaum Capital Partners LLC of Santa Monica, Calif., which holds a 25 percent 
stake. GSC Partners Inc. of Florham Park, N.J., and Bennett Management Corp. hold stakes of 16 
percent and 14 percent, respectively, according to a filing with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.” (Beaudette, M. in Dow Jones Newswires, 26 August 2004). 
 
Table 6 Panel A sets out summary statistics for the variables used in the multivariate 
analyses. The median FSrevaluation is close to zero, which is to be expected since half of 
the sample firms experience a decrease and the other half an increase in fresh start asset 
values. The average FSmisvaluation indicates that FS successor values underestimate 
market values by 5.5%, a number slightly higher than the 4% undervaluation reported by 
Lehavy (2002). Both the median and mean ratios of Debt-to-assets pre-bankruptcy are close 
to one, higher than the mean and median for the Compustat universe, an indication of 
financial distress and comparable to the ratios found in other studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2012). 
The mean (median) Operating performance pre-bankruptcy is -0.144 (-0.041), lower than 
the mean (median) for the Compustat universe and comparable to that found in other papers 
23 
 
on Chapter 11 firms. In Panel B of Table 6 we present mean values of selected firm 
characteristics by industry. FSrevaluation is more negative in the agriculture and mining 
sectors, and positive in the services sectors. Table 7 reports the pairwise correlation 
coefficients among variables used in the regression models.  
Place Tables 6 and 7 here 
 
4.2 VULTURE FUNDS’ STRATEGIES AND FRESH START VALUATION BIAS  
How does a particular VFStrategy affect FSrevaluation in a complex setting where other 
factors are present? We address this question by estimating the selection model presented 
in section 3. We report the results for the first measure of valuation bias (FSrevaluation) in 
Table 8 and for the second measure (FSmisvaluation) in Table 9. Panels A and B of Table 
8 present the results from the second and first stage of the FSrevaluation regressions, 
respectively. The results confirm the patterns observed in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 in Panel 
A of Table 8 show that the presence vultures holding LowISeniority debt instruments has a 
positive effect on FSrevaluation, and that the effect is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In economic terms, moving from a firm with no LowISeniority vulture investor to a 
firm with LowISeniority vulture investors results in a 1.487 (1.874/1.260) standard deviation 
increase in FSrevaluation. Activist vulture funds risk receiving nothing in the reorganized 
firm if the fresh start value is too low and thus have incentives to influence management 
estimates of fresh start values upwards to the point that their claims are partially (but not 
fully) impaired.  
The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 suggest that HighISeniority strategy is 
significantly related with a downward FSrevaluation, which confirms our prediction that 
vulture funds that acquire claim of HighISeniority vultures have incentives to negotiate 
lower fresh start values so that their claims are partially impaired and swapped for equity. 
The magnitude of the estimates is economically significant: a firm in Chapter 11 with 
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HighISeniority vulture investors’ exits bankruptcy with 1.138 (1.434/1.260) standard 
deviation lower fresh start values than a firm without HighISeniority vulture investors. As 
an additional analysis we decompose the dependent variable FSrevaluation into the three 
types of asset most impacted by fresh start accounting, i.e. ‘FS revaluation of PPE’, ‘FS 
revaluation of goodwill and intangibles’ and ‘FS revaluation other non-current assets’, and 
re-estimate the model. The results (reported in the internet Appendix) are consistent with 
our main findings in Table 8.   
In columns (2) and (4) we estimate the effect of VF LowISeniority and VF 
HighISeniority conditioned on Management compensation offered during bankruptcy. The 
effect of vulture fund strategy on FS revaluation reinforces with the amount of compensation 
offered to management during bankruptcy. When vultures have incentives to understate 
fresh start values granting managers the average amount of compensation increases the 
understatement by about 2%. On the other hand, when vultures favor overstated fresh start 
values offering the average management compensation enhances overstatement by about 
6%. Combined with the descriptive evidence in Table 4 these results suggest that 
management compensation is an important channel that vulture investors can use to exert 
influence over bankruptcy valuation. 
Regarding other factors affecting FSrevaluation, we find that Bankruptcy duration 
has a positive impact but only when vultures hold HighISeniority claims (column 3). This 
result suggests that HighISeniority vultures face strong opposition from claimants that are 
against lower valuations (junior claimants and shareholders), resulting in longer 
negotiations and possibly more amendments to the reorganization plans. Another 
noteworthy finding is the significantly positive effect of Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 
across all models, which indicates that when leverage is high there is relatively more 
impaired debt, and that the impaired claimants prefer upward FSrevaluation of assets in 
order to secure the recovery of their claims. We find that the Presence of other hedge funds 
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has a significant and positive effect on FSrevaluation when vultures hold HighISeniority 
claims, which is in line with our conjecture that other hedge funds are usually unsecured 
claimholders who favor larger valuations. We also find that firms with large levels of Public 
debt experience lower FSrevaluation. Considering that public debt is typically junior and 
held by a vast number of uncoordinated investors, other more powerful players are likely to 
have incentives to depress the firm value enough to wipe out junior public claimants. 
Number of claimants results in higher FS valuations because management and self-
interested parties have incentives to overstate the value of the successor firm to satisfy a 
large number of creditors in order to promote the acceptance of the plan17. Panel B of Table 
8 presents the determinants of vulture fund strategy (the first-stage treatment equation). 
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy is an important determinant of the HighISeniority strategy  as 
capital intensive firms  offer the possibility of subsequently selling the assets at increased 
prices. Vulture funds prefer a HighISeniority strategy when Debt to assets is high because 
there is a greater chance that senior claims will be converted into equity (columns 3 and 4). 
On the other hand, high leverage means a greater likelihood that junior claims will be 
completely wiped out, making a LowISeniority strategy less appealing (negative and 
significant coefficients in columns 1 and 2). High levels of Public debt (typically junior) 
encourage vulture funds to buy LowISeniority rather than HighISeniority claims because 
they are better able to solve coordination problems among junior public debtholders. We 
also find that vulture funds are less attracted to a HighISeniority strategy when the Secured 
(bank) is large which suggests that there is less room for senior debt holders’ activism when 
banks hold large portions of debt. On the other hand, vulture funds are more inclined to 
HighISeniority strategy when other hedge funds hold equity positions in the firms. A large 
                                                            
17 In an untabulated analysis we give consideration to the possibility that the location of bankruptcy filing 
may play a role in determining FS values (for example Amiraslani et al., 2017 suggests that bankruptcy 
court ruling in Delaware alters debt contracting relevance of balance sheet numbers). We obtain locations 
from the plans of reorganization for 105 of the 127 sample firms and find that 90% of firms have Delaware 
as their bankruptcy venue. Our analysis indicates that the location does not appear to play a role for our 
sample of Chapter 11 firms.  
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number of claimants discourage LowISeniority investments. Finally, instrumental variable 
bond return is positively related to LowISeniority and negatively related with 
HighISeniority. When bond market  conditions are good (measured by positive bond returns 
over the previous three months) distressed-oriented investors are more inclined to invest in 
relatively more junior than in senior claims because the risk of a full impairment is lower.18  
Place Table 8 here 
Table 9 reports the regression results for outcome variable FSmisvaluation (ve – vm,e). For 
brevity we report only the second-stage results; the determinants of vulture funds’ 
investment decisions are similar to those presented in Table 8 Panel B.  In line with the 
FSrevaluation results, when vulture funds acquire LowISeniority debt instruments 
FSmisvaluation tends to increase as the fresh start value of assets approximates the market 
value at emergence date. Conversely, when vulture funds holdings are HighISeniority the 
fresh start value deviates further from market value. These findings are consistent with the 
idea that the valuation bias in the fresh start value of the firm is increasing (i.e. greater 
misstatement) with vulture fund involvement in bankruptcy reorganizations. A probable 
channel used by vulture funds to influence the valuation negotiations is the alignment with 
management interests achieved through compensation schemes. The negative coefficient of 
Management compensation * HighISeniority suggests that the underestimation of fresh start 
values is greater when managers receive generous compensation during bankruptcy 
negotiations.   
Place Table 9 here 
 
4.3. THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM AFTER BANKRUPTCY: THE WHIPLASH 
EFFECT  
                                                            
18 To account for the possibility that conditions in the bond market are also related to FS asset values, i.e. the 
dependent variable in the second-stage equation, we repeat the tests including Bond return in the second-
stage equation. The results do not indicate a systematic relation with either FSrevaluation or 
FSmisvaluation.  
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One way to tray and detect strategic influence (pressure) on FS valuation is to examine 
whether the market adjusts the FS value of the firm after it emerges from bankruptcy. If the 
firm emerges from bankruptcy, it would not come as a surprise if future market value 
exceeds the emergence FS value. What would be surprising is to observe that a downward 
(upward) FS revaluation is systematically followed by an increase (decrease) in subsequent 
market value. These systematic reversals in value would suggest that the FS values of assets, 
which are estimated based on fair values, are subsequently found to be incorrect by the 
market. We refer to the post-bankruptcy reversal of value as the whiplash effect. We suggest 
that the whiplash effect is indicative of FS valuation bias. Figure 2 illustrates the definition 
of the whiplash. The value of the predecessor firm at the filing date is vf, the value of the 
successor firm at emerging date is ve; and the market value at period t after bankruptcy is 
vm,t. For example, the whiplash () occurs when vf  > ve (downward FS revaluation) is 
followed by vm,t  > ve (upward market revaluation). That is:  
       ߱ ൌ ൫ݒ௙ െ ݒ௘൯ ൅ ൫ݒ௠,௧ െ ݒ௘൯     (2) 
 
We compute whiplash () as the sum of the two elements. The first element is the 
negative difference between the successor’s FS value of assets and the predecessor's assets 
(term (vf - ve)).19 The second element is the difference between the market value of the firm 
four quarters after emergence and the successor’s FS value of (term (vm,t - ve)). The variable 
is scaled by book value of equity plus book value of debt after emergence. 
We re-estimate the model replacing the dependent variable with whiplash and set 
out the results in Table 10.  We find a significant (at the 1% level) downward (upward) post-
emergence market revaluation in the presence of vultures holding LowISeniority 
(HighISeniority) claims. These reversals of the FS value suggest that assets values have 
been biased by LowISeniority (HighISeniority) vultures during bankruptcy. It is possible 
                                                            
19 Note that the first element is equivalent to the negative of the FSrevaluation. 
28 
 
that vulture investors have strategically influenace FS valuation to create the opportunity to 
earn significant returns from subsequent value shifts. For example, vultures could earn high 
rents by negotiating FS values relatively down and then subsequently selling their equity 
positions at higher market values. To control for the fact that the reversal of FS value may 
result from changes in the firm’s performance, we include the variable Operating 
performance post-emergence (average of the ratio of operating income to sales in the first 
year post-bankruptcy).  
Other noteworthy findings are as follows. Similarly to Table 8, we observe a positive 
relation between Tangibility pre-bankruptcy and whiplash. The whiplash effect decreases 
with the CEO time at bankruptcy which indicates that when the CEO is replaced shortly 
before reorganization negotiations, there is greater fresh start valuation bias (Lehavy, 2002). 
Number of claimants is positively associated with whiplash suggesting that vultures may be 
able to extract higher rents by overcoming coordination problems amongst numerous 
classes of claims. Public debt is negatively associated with whiplash in line with findings 
in Table 8. The positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient of Time suggests that 
there are greater shifts in subsequent market values for firms that reorganize in periods of 
high prevalence of bankruptcies (bad economic conditions).  
Place Table 10 here 
 
4.4 ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS AFTER BANKRUPTCY 
Given that we argue that vulture funds influence the FS estimates, the reported estimates 
need to be re-assessed and the misstatements corrected when the market value of the assets 
changes. As a result, sooner or later the firm needs to formally amend its accounts. We 
investigate whether the likelihood of a formal restatement increases with the presence of 
loan-to-own vulture investors.  
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We collect the data on financial restatement types from Audit Analytics, and we 
select the types that are related to the valuation of assets. For example, we include 
restatements related to balance sheet classification and measurement of assets, irregularities 
related to measurement and recognition of goodwill, and errors with respect to capitalization 
of expenditures. We construct Restatement that takes the value of one if a firm reports an 
accounting restatement in the first year after emerging from bankruptcy due to asset 
valuation issues, and zero otherwise.  
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that about 40% of the firms report 
accounting restatements related with asset valuation issues in the year after emergence. We 
re-estimate the model employing Restatement as the dependent variable in the second stage 
and including two additional explanatory variables: FS revaluation of intangibles and Loss 
post-bankruptcy. Intangibles are the assets that exhibit the largest FS revaluation (as shown 
in Table 2) and they are generally hard to value which can give rise to measurement errors 
that might have to be corrected by restatements. Loss-making firms are more likely to 
engage in GAAP manipulations that when discovered result in formal accounts restatements 
(Callen et al., 2008). Results reported in Table 11 Panel A show that firms with 
HighISeniority vultures are more likely to report an accounting restatement after emergence. 
Combined with the results of FSrevaluation and FSmisvaluation (Tables 8 and 9), this 
finding suggests a higher probability of restatements for firms which emerge from 
bankruptcy with depressed FS values. In a setting where conservative accounting practices 
(reflected in relatively low asset values) are considered desirable for investors (e.g., Penman 
and Zhang, 2002), we would not expect firms with relatively low FS values to need to restate 
their accounts almost immediately after bankruptcy unless their FS accounts are unduly 
depressed. This evidence is in support of HighISeniority vultures’ stronger preference for 
depressed FS values that will be corrected in the subsequent accounting restatements.20  
                                                            
20 In untabulated tests we narrow down the definition of the Restatement variable and code only the 
restatements of the assets most impacted by FS revaluations (PPE, GW and intangibles, other non-current 
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To confirm that depressed FS values associated with the presence of HighISeniority 
vulture funds are subsequently restated in the opposite direction we obtain the asset value 
of the restatements from SEC filings. In Table 11 Panel B we report that the average asset 
value of the post-bankruptcy restatement is $US million 1,690 or -12% of the asset value of 
the firm at emergence. But this amount jumps to $US million 4,309, or 5% of successors’ 
assets value, when vulture investors have incentives to downplay FS values, i.e., when VF 
hold HighISeniority positions. This result provides additional support to our conjecture that 
HighISeniority vulture funds can overly bias FS values downwards during bankruptcy 
negotiations. 
 
Place Table 11 here 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
This research shows how the fresh start valuation of assets is an important mechanism in 
the settlements of claims in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Since the fresh start value of assets of 
the new emerging firm are based on management-produced forecasts, there is scope for 
valuation discretion, particularly by claimants with a substantial influence in the bankruptcy 
negotiations. Distress-oriented hedge funds (known as vulture funds) achieve great 
influence over negotiations by purchasing large parts of the partially impaired debt of the 
distressed firm; this is the class of debt that grants maximum voting power in the 
reorganization plan that defines the fresh start value of the firm. We find that vulture fund 
involvement in bankruptcy negotiations is associated with fresh start valuation bias in a way 
that strengthens their control rights at the exit from bankruptcy. Our findings suggest that 
when vulture funds acquire debt claims of relatively low seniority in the capital structure of 
the distressed firm, they negotiate for higher fresh start valuations to ensure that their claims 
                                                            
assets).  The coefficient on HighISeniority remains positive but the number of restatement cases drops 
substantially reducing the power of the estimations. The coefficient is not statistically significant.  
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are partially rather than fully impaired, and hence swapped for equity in the new firm. In 
contrast, when vulture funds acquire debt claims of relatively high seniority they favor lower 
fresh start value because the lower priority debtors then receive little or no share in the 
equity of the emerging firm, and the vulture fund ends up with a larger proportion of the 
equity. We suggest that the data is consistent with the hypothesis that self-interested 
opportunistic vulture funds exert influence on fresh start valuations in order to gain 
important control over the new emerging firm and to earn future excess returns. Our 
evidence adds to the debate on whether the large returns that vulture funds earn on 
investments in distressed firms is de-facto evidence of their role in improving the efficiency 
of court-supervised reorganizations. Our study highlights that it should not be assumed that 
these returns arise simply because of the superior management skills that vulture fund 
members bring to revising the fundamental business model of the firm. The returns may 
also be explained, at least partly, by vulture funds having strong incentives to introduce bias 
into the valuation process of court-supervised bankruptcies. One side effect of this potential 
strategic bias is that predecessor equity holders and other interested participants may suffer 
a considerably disadvantage.   
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Figure 1  
The hierarchy of claims in bankruptcy and pressure over the fresh start value of the firm 
Hierarchy of claims 
 
 
Note:This figure is an adaption and extension of figure 2 in Ivashina et al., (2016). 
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Figure 2 
Post-bankruptcy reversal of fresh start value – an example of the Whiplash effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For simplicity the above diagram has been drawn assuming a fixed FS downward revaluation (vf -ve) 
and a varying upward magnitude of market revaluation (vm,t -ve) depending upon the presence of 
vulture funds. In reality the magnitude of (vf -ve) can also vary with vulture fund presence.   
  
vf 
Bankruptcy 
Filing date (f) 
ve 
Bankruptcy 
Emerging date (e)
T period after 
emergence (t)
Downward FS revaluation 
Decrease ve 
Upward market revaluation  
Increase vm,t 
vm 
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Table 1 - Variable definitions 
FSrevaluation Successor total assets minus predecessor total assets, scaled by book value of 
equity plus book value of debt after emergence of bankruptcy i.e. (ve – vf).  
FSmisvaluation Successor total assets minus market value at emergence of bankruptcy, scaled 
by market value of equity plus book value of debt after emergence of 
bankruptcy i.e. (ve - vm,e).  
VF LowISenority claim Indicator variable coded as one if vulture funds hold debt claims of relatively 
low-intermediate seniority typically junior unsecured debt, and zero otherwise.
VF HighISeniority claim Indicator variable coded as one if vulture funds hold debt claims of relatively 
high- intermediate seniority, typically senior unsecured debt or secured debt, 
and zero otherwise. 
DIP financing Indicator variable coded one if the firm has DIP financing, and zero otherwise.
Bankruptcy duration Natural log transformation of the number of days between the Chapter 11 
filing date and emerging date. 
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy Industry-adjusted ratio of operating income to sales in the year before 
bankruptcy filing. Industry median is calculated at two-digit SIC level. 
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy Average of total debt-to-assets in the year before bankruptcy filing.  
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy Indicator variable coded as one if a firm has an average ratio of net plant, 
property and equipment to total assets in the year before filing for bankruptcy 
above the sample median, and zero otherwise.  
CEO time at bankruptcy 
 
Natural log transformation of the number of days the CEO has served in the 
firm at bankruptcy filing date. 
Public debt Indicator variable coded as one if the amount of public debt in the year before 
bankruptcy filing is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
Presence of other hedge funds Indicator variable coded as one if at least one non-distress hedge fund is an 
equity holder during bankruptcy, and zero otherwise. 
Secured debt Average ratio of secured bank debt to total assets in the year before 
bankruptcy filing. 
Number of claimants Number of claim classes identified in the reorganization plan. 
Time Indicator variable coded as one if the bankruptcy filing date is in periods of 
high prevalence of bankruptcies (2000-2003 and 2009-2010), and zero 
otherwise. 
Management compensation  The amount of management compensation granted during bankruptcy to total 
assets multiplied by 10^3.  
HF distress return Monthly average return over the three months before bankruptcy filing of a 
return index of distress-investing hedge funds. 
Bond return Monthly average return over the three months before bankruptcy filing of the 
S&P 500 bond returns. 
Whiplash - FSrevaluation + (Market value of assets 12 months after emergence - 
Successor total assets); i.e. (vf – ve) + (vm,t - ve). The variable is scaled by book 
value of equity plus book value of debt after bankruptcy. 
Operating performance post-
bankruptcy 
Average of the ratio of operating income to sales in the first year post-
bankruptcy. 
Restatement Indicator variable coded as one if the firm reports an accounting restatement in 
the first year after emerging from bankruptcy due to asset valuation issues, and 
zero otherwise. 
FS revaluation of intangibles Indicator coded as one if the firm has fresh start adjustments for goodwill and 
intangibles, and zero otherwise. 
Loss post-bankruptcy Indicator variable coded as one if the firm has operating losses in the first year 
after emerging from bankruptcy, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2 – Fresh start revaluations by main asset categories (In Million $) 
The table reports mean and median values of main classes of assets at Chapter 11 entry (predecessor firm) and at Chapter 11 exit (fresh start value of assets of the successor firm). 
The sample includes 127 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and applied fresh start valuation.  
  All FS revaluations Positive FS revaluations  Negative FS revaluations  
  Predecessor Successor Change Predecessor Successor Change  Predecessor Successor Change  
PPE Mean 1,001.474 815.042 -186.433 ** 1,063.429 1,063.701 0.272  942.379 577.859 -364.520 ** 
 Median 282.928 202.971 -5.315 *** 189.383 203.612 0.255  334.291 196.548 -56.118 *** 
GW and intangibles Mean 243.299 655.463 412.164 *** 296.516 1,134.876 838.360 *** 192.538 198.176 5.638  
 Median 24.343 104.464 1.193 *** 57.850 275.554 154.400 *** 4.493 0.000 0.000  
Other noncurrent assets Mean 298.122 226.193 -71.929 ** 151.708 178.602 26.894  437.779 271.588 -166.191 ** 
 Median 47.042 32.078 0.000 ** 49.588 44.036 0.000  42.362 26.027 -3.107 **** 
Total assets Mean 2,867.556 2,933.422 65.865 2,343.528 3,218.694 875.166  3,367.399 2,661.315 -706.083  
  Median 919.867 836.597 -1.388 942.487 1,192.608 185.192   912.510 719.084 -180.589  
Observations = 127          
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Table 3 – Summary statistics of fresh start valuation bias  
The table reports summary statistics of fresh start (FS) revaluation (assets of successor firm - assets of predecessor firm, scaled 
by book value of equity plus book value of debt after bankruptcy) and FS misvaluation (successor value of the firm -market 
value of the firm at emergence, scaled by market value of equity plus book value of debt after bankruptcy).  Panel A shows 
statistics by type of vulture fund (VF) loan-to-own strategy and Panel B reports statistics by presence of vulture fund (Panel 
B). The difference in means (medians) in Panel A is tested using a two-tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). 
 
Panel A:  Summary statistics by vulture fund strategy 
  
FS revaluation  
(ve – vf)
  FS misvaluation 
(ve - vm,e)
 N Mean Median Nr. 
positive 
Nr. 
negative 
 N Mean Median 
Firms in which:           
(1) VF hold LowISeniority claims 21 0.269 0.253 20 1  21 -0.076 -0.048 
          
(2) VF hold HighISeniority claims 39 -0.196 -0.057 13 26  33 -0.093 -0.115 
          
(3) VF hold both LowISeniority and 
HighISeniority claims 3 -0.188 9.000 1 2 
 
- - - 
          
Test of difference between VF 
strategies (1) - (2): p-value 
  
<0.001 0.004     
   
0.428 
 
<0.001 
 
Panel B: Mean and median values by vulture fund involvement 
    FS revaluation (ve – vf) FS misvaluation (ve - vm,e)
 N Mean Median N Mean Median
(1) Firms with vulture fund involvement 63 -0.040 0.009 54 -0.086 -0.094 
(2) Firms without vulture fund involvement 64 -0.308 -0.013 47 -0.019 -0.009 
       
Test of difference (1) - (2): p-value  <0.001 <0.001  0.357 0.049 
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Table 4 – Management compensation in bankruptcy and vulture fund involvement 
The table reports summary statistics of management compensation during bankruptcy (amount of compensation to total assets 
multiplied by 103).Panel A shows statistics by vulture fund presence and Panel B reports mean values of management 
compensation for low and high competition among claimants. Strong competition is measured as an indicator taking the value 
of one if the number of voting classes is above the sample median. The difference in means (medians) is tested using a two-
tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). 
 
Panel A: Mean and median values by vulture fund involvement 
  
Management compensation 
in bankruptcy
 Mean Median 
(1) Firms with vulture fund involvement 1.498 0.063 
(2) Firms without vulture fund involvement 0.344 0.000 
 
Test of difference (1) - (2): p-value 0.006 <0.001 
 
Panel B: Management compensation and competition among claimants 
 
Weak 
competition  
Strong 
competition 
Test of difference 
Strong - Weak: p-value 
Firms with vulture fund involvement 2.354 0.616 0.020 
Firms without vulture fund involvement 0.386 0.263 0.656 
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Table 5 – Equity holdings of vulture funds at entry and exit from bankruptcy 
This table compares equity holding at entry and exit from bankruptcy for vulture fund (VF) strategies. The difference in means 
(medians) is tested using a two-tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test).  
 
  
% VF equity holdings 
at bankruptcy entry  
(A) 
 % VF equity holdings 
at bankruptcy exit 
(B) 
Difference in %  VF 
equity holdings at exit 
and entry,  (B) - (A):  
p-value 
Firms in which: Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median 
(1) VF hold LowISeniority claims 0.015 0.000 0.216 0.177 < 0.001 < 0.001 
(2) VF hold HighISeniority claims 0.003 0.000 0.167 0.149 < 0.001 < 0.001 
(3) VF hold both types of claims 
(LowI and HighI Seniority) 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.074 0.038 0.098 
All firms with VF involvement (N=63) 0.007 0.000  0.179 0.157 < 0.001 < 0.001 
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Table 6 – Summary statistics and firm characteristics by industry 
The table reports summary statistics of variables used in multivariate analyses (Panel A), and summary statistics of 
selected firm characteristics by industry (Panel B). The sample includes 127 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 
bankruptcy and adopted fresh start accounting (for whiplash the number of observations is 121 and for FS misevaluation 
is 101). Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
  Mean Median St.dev. P25 P75 
Fresh Start revaluation (ve – vf) -0.175 -0.002 1.260 -0.221 0.198 
Fresh Start misvaluation (ve - vm,e) -0.055 -0.047 0.365 -0.218 0.119 
VF LowISeniority claims 0.189 0 0.393 0 0 
VF HighISeniority claims 0.331 0 0.472 0 1 
DIP financing 0.693 1 0.463 0 1 
Bankruptcy duration (years) 1.185 0.889 1.193 0.369 1.622 
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.144 -0.041 0.805 -0.112 0.037 
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.987 0.843 0.689 0.629 1.122 
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.472 0 0.501 0 1 
CEO time at bankruptcy (years) 3.502 1.936 4.090 0.553 5.003 
Public debt 0.669 1 0.472 0 1 
Presence of other hedge funds 0.535 1 0.501 0 1 
Secured debt 1.433 0.952 1.826 0.711 1.360 
Number of claimants 10.047 9.000 3.956 8.000 11 
Time 0.591 1 0.494 0 1 
Management compensation 0.917 0 2.368 0 0.561 
HF distress return 1.164 1.240 0.965 0.533 1.879 
Bond returns 0.630 1 0.485 0 1 
Whiplash 0.095 -0.055 1.459 -0.390 0.228 
Operating performance post-bankruptcy -2.226 0.093 26.075 0.040 0.124 
Restatement 0.394 0 0.491 0 1 
FS revaluation of intangibles 0.512 1 0.502 0 1 
Loss post-bankruptcy 0.299 0 0.460 0 1 
 
Panel B: Mean values of selected firm characteristics by industry 
 Agriculture, 
mining and 
construction 
N=22 
Manufacturing 
and 
transportation 
N=67 
Retail and 
comm.-
cation 
N=14 
Finance and 
other 
services 
N=24 
Fresh Start revaluation (ve – vf) -0.649 -0.113 -0.089 0.037 
Fresh Start misevaluation (ve - vm,e) 0.036 -0.083 -0.038 -0.078 
VF LowISeniority claims 0.182 0.239 0.071 0.125 
VF HighISeniority claims 0.364 0.269 0.429 0.417 
Restatement 0.455 0.373 0.500 0.333 
Bankruptcy duration (years) 0.955 1.344 1.320 0.873 
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.269 -0.164 0.008 -0.060 
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 1.103 0.944 0.800 1.110 
Public debt 0.682 0.687 0.714 0.583 
Presence of other hedge funds 0.500 0.567 0.357 0.583 
Number of claimants 9.773 10.075 8.857 10.917 
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Table 7 – Correlation matrix 
The table reports Pearson correlations of variables for a sample includes of 127 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and adopted fresh start accounting (for whiplash the number of observations is 121 
and for FS misevaluation is 101). Variables are defined in Table 1. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Fresh Start revaluation (ve – vf) 1                     
(2) Fresh Start misevaluation (ve - vm,e) -0.458 1   
(3) VF LowISeniority claims 0.149 -0.030 1   
(4) VF HighISeniority claims -0.011 -0.045 -0.211 1  
(5) DIP financing 0.002 0.088 0.147 -0.040 1  
(6) Bankruptcy duration (years) 0.110 -0.133 0.139 -0.131 0.140 1  
(7) Operating performance pre-bankruptcy 0.695 -0.433 0.045 0.087 0.085 0.010 1  
(8) Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.099 0.021 -0.042 0.037 -0.160 -0.221 0.059 1  
(9) Tangibility pre-bankruptcy -0.193 0.111 -0.054 0.072 -0.020 -0.096 -0.155 -0.084 1  
(10) CEO time at bankruptcy (years) 0.012 0.054 -0.121 -0.121 0.069 -0.097 -0.005 0.099 -0.032 1  
(11) Public debt -0.053 0.202 0.168 -0.075 0.004 -0.122 0.016 0.186 0.196 0.076 1 
(12) Presence of other hedge funds 0.098 -0.015 0.127 0.051 -0.038 0.188 -0.013 -0.149 -0.036 -0.222 0.050 
(13) Secured debt 0.013 0.083 -0.019 -0.072 -0.122 -0.191 0.000 0.518 0.011 -0.010 0.194 
(14) Number of claimants 0.049 -0.080 0.040 0.034 -0.014 0.276 -0.110 -0.109 -0.031 0.004 0.055 
(15) Time -0.158 0.217 -0.089 0.177 -0.173 -0.292 -0.094 0.137 0.018 0.027 0.164 
(16) Management compensation  0.042 0.008 0.132 0.158 0.160 -0.034 0.043 -0.061 -0.066 -0.057 0.056 
(17) HF distress return 0.196 -0.269 -0.024 0.027 -0.247 -0.048 0.121 0.103 -0.189 0.023 0.081 
(18) Bond returns 0.018 -0.074 0.120 -0.120 -0.157 0.115 -0.113 0.004 -0.091 0.095 -0.019 
(19) Whiplash -0.966 0.375 -0.143 0.002 0.052 -0.101 -0.888 -0.097 0.204 0.024 0.020 
(20) Operating performance post-bankruptcy -0.013 -0.109 0.043 0.064 -0.060 -0.129 0.003 -0.117 0.084 0.042 0.127 
(21) Restatement 0.013 -0.074 -0.019 0.222 0.012 -0.125 0.115 0.143 -0.020 0.100 0.155 
(22) FS revaluation of intangibles 0.262 -0.153 0.150 -0.218 -0.001 0.142 0.104 0.186 -0.054 0.047 0.084 
(23) Loss post-bankruptcy -0.262 0.205 -0.140 0.052 -0.161 -0.114 -0.103 -0.063 0.208 -0.071 0.094 
 
    (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(12) Presence of other hedge funds 1   
(13) Secured debt -0.254 1   
(14) Number of claimants 0.252 -0.093 1   
(15) Time -0.101 0.178 0.144 1   
(16) Management compensation -0.007 0.017 -0.129 0.161 1  
(17) HF distress return -0.011 0.157 0.066 -0.037 -0.193 1  
(18) Bond returns -0.060 0.125 0.009 0.058 -0.002 0.340 1  
(19) Whiplash -0.152 0.016 -0.018 0.140 -0.051 -0.174 -0.024 1  
(20) Operating performance post-bankruptcy -0.082 0.024 0.115 0.107 0.034 0.175 -0.068 -0.003 1  
(21) Restatement -0.090 0.005 0.121 0.212 0.007 0.115 0.017 0.023 -0.110 1  
(22) FS revaluation of intangibles -0.025 0.215 0.160 -0.076 0.114 0.178 0.132 -0.247 0.092 -0.084 1  
(23) Loss post-bankruptcy 0.023 -0.031 0.018 0.125 -0.026 -0.102 -0.140 0.184 0.056 0.072 -0.119 1 
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Table 8 – Vulture fund strategies and the fresh start revaluation of the firm 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model. Panel A presents coefficients and z-statistics (in parenthesis) 
from the second stage equation estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority 
claims) on fresh start revaluation (dependent variable is FSrevaluation: successor value of assets minus predecessor value of 
assets, i.e. ve – vf ). Panel B reports coefficients and z-statistics from the first stage equation estimating the determinants of the 
vulture fund strategies. Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the year level. The 
symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: The effect on fresh start revaluation: ve – vf  (second-stage equation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VF LowISeniority claims 1.874*** 1.744***  
 (6.151) (3.620)  
VF HighSeniority claims -1.434*** -1.414*** 
  (-5.191) (-6.058)    
DIP financing 0.069 0.035 0.092 0.103 
  (0.203) (0.089) (0.516) (0.557)    
Bankruptcy duration -0.003 0.050 0.071*** 0.083*** 
 (-0.059) (0.663) (4.070) (6.666)   
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy 0.977 1.060 1.172* 1.167* 
  (1.517) (1.555) (1.889) (1.873)    
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.215*** 0.242** 0.299*** 0.300*** 
 (2.959) (2.300) (17.665) (11.713)   
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.009 -0.002 0.033 0.041* 
  (0.071) (-0.021) (1.096) (1.661)    
CEO time at bankruptcy 0.005 0.024 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.407) (1.052) (-0.121) (-0.066)   
Public debt -0.483*** -0.526** -0.376* -0.355*
  (-2.960) (-2.385) (-1.863) (-1.777)    
Presence of other hedge funds 0.122 0.118 0.312** 0.298** 
 (0.844) (0.736) (2.476) (2.301)   
Secured debt 0.014 0.017 -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.826) (0.543) (-1.240) (-1.260)   
Number of claimants 0.034*** 0.037** 0.040* 0.043* 
 (2.651) (2.535) (1.721) (1.860)   
Time -0.105 -0.119 0.056 -0.018 
 (-0.359) (-0.953) (0.318) (-0.169)   
Management compensation 0.010  0.028** 
 (0.574)  (2.168)   
Managt. compensation * VFLowISeniority 0.0623**  
  (2.041)     
Managt. compensation * VF HighSeniority  -0.023* 
   (-1.678)    
Constant -1.661*** -1.173*** -0.595*** -0.708*** 
 (-3.995) (-5.394) (-3.254) (-3.671) 
Observations 127 127 127 127 
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0): Chi2 13.246*** 4.022** 14.970*** 20.172*** 
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Table 8 – Vulture fund strategies and the fresh start revaluation of the firm (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Determinants of vulture fund strategy (first-stage equation) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy 0.636 0.645 1.155* 1.154* 
 (1.074) (1.100) (1.742) (1.735) 
  
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy -0.170*** -0.167** 0.224*** 0.231*** 
 (-3.697) (-2.490) (27.213) (17.399) 
  
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy -0.154 -0.182 0.434*** 0.394*** 
 (-0.594) (-0.799) (7.840) (11.051) 
  
CEO time at bankruptcy -0.132*** -0.122** 0.002 0.000 
 (-2.622) (-1.971) (0.039) (0.009) 
  
Public debt 0.878*** 0.803*** -0.444*** -0.411*** 
 (3.856) (3.086) (-5.785) (-4.375) 
  
Presence of other hedge funds 0.171 0.201 0.465** 0.465*** 
 (1.088) (1.276) (2.473) (2.893) 
  
Secured debt 0.016 -0.007 -0.094*** -0.103*** 
 (0.405) (-0.252) (-4.113) (-4.754) 
  
Number of claimants -0.023* -0.025** 0.046 0.042 
 (-1.694) (-2.072) (1.461) (1.446) 
  
Time -0.196 -0.173 0.569*** 0.520*** 
 (-0.631) (-0.547) (3.684) (8.101) 
  
HF distress return 0.127 0.113 0.032 0.018 
 (0.936) (0.533) (1.109) (0.486) 
  
Bond return 0.762*** 0.777*** -0.250* -0.220** 
 (6.235) (3.351) (-1.873) (-1.988) 
  
Constant -0.655 -0.615 -1.146*** -1.068*** 
  (-1.368) (-0.972) (-2.680) (-3.366) 
Observations 127 127 127 127 
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Table 9 - Vulture fund strategies and the fresh start misvaluation ve – vm,e  (second-stage equation) 
The table presents results for the second stage equation of a two stage treatment model estimating the effect of vulture fund 
strategies (VF LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority claims) on fresh start misevaluation (dependent variable is 
FSmisvaluation: successor value of assets minus market value of assets at emergence, i.e. ve – vm,e). Variables are defined in Table 
1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are adjusted for group correlation at the year level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VF LowISeniority claims 0.264*** 0.282*  
 (3.017) (1.812)    
VF HighSeniority claims -0.691*** -0.682***
 (-9.603) (-6.089)  
DIP financing 0.078 0.065 0.028 0.037 
 (0.593) (0.447) (0.461) (0.610)  
Bankruptcy duration 0.019 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (1.379) (0.138) (-0.122) (-0.106)  
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.185*** -0.213*** -0.177*** -0.176***
 (-5.780) (-5.439) (-12.681) (-11.023)  
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.006 0.009 0.061* 0.056* 
 (0.119) (0.134) (1.835) (1.866)  
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.094* 0.089*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 
 (1.722) (4.191) (42.015) (12.853)  
CEO time at bankruptcy 0.034 0.027 0.014 0.012 
 (1.484) (1.113) (1.021) (0.904)  
Public debt 0.057 0.049 0.098*** 0.102*** 
 (0.830) (0.558) (7.087) (7.588)  
Presence of other hedge funds 0.052 0.053 0.006 0.009 
 (0.936) (0.761) (0.137) (0.175)  
Secured debt 0.015 0.012 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.512) (0.291) (-0.391) (-0.344)  
Number of claimants -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (-2.927) (-5.857) (-0.523) (-0.597)  
Time 0.154*** 0.155*** -0.004 -0.007 
 (3.521) (3.287) (-0.201) (-0.261)  
Management compensation 0.005 0.008*** 
 (0.387) (40.180)  
Managt. compensation * VF LowISeniority -0.013  
 (-0.166)   
Managt .compensation * VF HighSeniority -0.015***
 (-2.660)  
Constant -0.421*** -0.501*** -0.022 -0.018 
 (-15.777) (-6.281) (-0.101) (-0.106) 
 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0): Chi2 3.869** 3.686** 379.507** 48.924***
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Table 10 – Market reversal of fresh start revaluation post-bankruptcy – the 
whiplash effect 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model (second stage equation). 
The coefficients and z-statistics are from estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF 
LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority claims) on market reversals of fresh start 
revaluation 12 months after exit from Chapter 11 (dependent variable is Whiplash: - 
FSrevaluation + (MV of assets 12 months after emergence - successor value of assets); i.e. (vf 
– ve) + (vm,t - ve)). Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for group 
correlation at the year level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VF LowISeniority claims -0.377*** 
 (-3.398)  
VF HighSeniority claims 0.518*** 
 (4.247)  
DIP financing -0.003 -0.012 
 (-0.052) (-0.433)  
Bankruptcy duration -0.157* -0.136 
 (-1.652) (-1.358)  
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.547 -0.484 
 (-1.353) (-1.349)  
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy -0.032 -0.000 
 (-0.636) (-0.005)  
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.299* 0.258*** 
 (1.814) (2.644)  
CEO time at bankruptcy -0.069* -0.079** 
 (-1.860) (-2.558)  
Public debt -0.292** -0.311** 
 (-2.214) (-2.375)  
Presence of other hedge funds -0.058 -0.142 
 (-0.221) (-0.602)  
Secured debt -0.007 -0.122*** 
 (-0.203) (-5.358)  
Number of claimants 0.039*** 0.042*** 
 (4.176) (3.947)  
Time 0.810*** 0.698*** 
 (6.526) (5.012)  
Operating performance post-bankruptcy 0.097 0.428 
 (0.157) (0.935)  
Constant 0.041 -0.932 
 (0.036) (-1.026) 
Observations 121 121 
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0): Chi2 6.292** 3.777** 
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Table 11 - Post-bankruptcy accounting restatements 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model (second stage equation). The 
coefficients and z-statistics are from estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF LowISeniority 
claims and VF HighISeniority claims) on accounting restatements (dependent variable is Restatement: 
indicator variable coded as one if the firm reports an accounting restatement due to asset valuation in 
the first year after bankruptcy, and zero otherwise). Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors 
are adjusted for group correlation at the year level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: The probability of post-bankruptcy restatements 
  (1) (2) 
VF LowISeniority claims -0.223 
 (-1.593)  
VF HighSeniority claims 0.286*** 
 (6.426)  
DIP financing -0.002 0.011 
 (-0.013) (0.088)  
Bankruptcy duration -0.055 -0.016 
 (-0.638) (-0.331)  
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.190 -0.061 
 (-0.601) (-0.222)  
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.125 0.083 
 (1.599) (1.079)  
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.015 -0.060 
 (0.127) (-0.499)  
CEO time at bankruptcy -0.002 -0.008 
 (-0.051) (-0.561)  
Public debt 0.194 0.324*** 
 (1.139) (3.044)  
Presence of other hedge funds -0.228 -0.228*** 
 (-1.643) (-2.987) 
Secured debt -0.123*** -0.154*** 
 (-3.383) (-5.473)  
Number of claimants 0.006 0.019 
 (0.298) (0.974)  
Time 0.133** 0.262*** 
 (2.061) (5.635)  
FS revaluation of intangibles 0.123 0.203*** 
 (0.897) (3.496)  
Loss post-bankruptcy -0.083 -0.091 
 (-0.575) (-0.330)  
Constant -0.143 -0.345** 
 (-0.218) (-2.052) 
Observations 127 127 
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0):Chi2 1.496 3.398** 
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Table 11 - Post-bankruptcy accounting restatements (cont.) 
Panel B: The asset value of restatements when VF hold HighSeniority claims 
VF HighSeniority claims: ($US million) 
As a proportion of 
Successor asset value
Yes 4,309.00 0.05 
No -230.31 -0.26 
Total 1,690.17 -0.12 
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Internet Appendix 
 
Fresh start revaluation and vulture fund strategies by type of asset (second equation) 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model. Panel A presents coefficients and z-statistics (in parenthesis) 
from the second stage equation estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority claims) 
on fresh start revaluation for main types of assets (PPE – plant property and equipment, GW&I – goodwill and intangibles, ONCA – 
other non-current assets). Variables are defined in Table 1 of the paper. Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the year 
level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
FS rev. 
PPE 
FS rev. 
PPE 
FS rev. 
GW&I. 
FS rev. 
GW&I 
FS rev. 
ONCA 
FS rev. 
ONCA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VF LowISeniority claims 0.846*** 0.243** 0.512*** 
 (4.362) (2.031) (5.717)    
VF HighSeniority claims  -0.754*** -0.477***  -0.476*** 
   (-5.201) (-3.540)  (-6.316)      
DIP financing 0.012 0.007 -0.031* -0.002 -0.097 -0.040 
  (0.069) (0.085) (-1.722) (-0.037) (-1.099) (-0.701)      
Bankruptcy duration 0.030* 0.039*** 0.032** 0.025*** 0.001 0.018 
 (1.657) (6.841) (2.118) (2.648) (0.013) (0.848)     
Operating performance pre-
bankruptcy 0.508 0.595** 0.000 0.039*** 0.343 0.396* 
  (1.567) (2.037) (0.008) (2.670) (1.579) (1.894)      
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.067 0.103*** 0.124*** 0.161*** 0.009 0.042** 
 (1.209) (9.056) (8.029) (16.006) (0.609) (2.351)     
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy -0.059 -0.036 0.019 0.061*** 0.025 0.043 
  (-1.027) (-1.381) (0.369) (2.643) (1.108) (1.461)      
CEO time at bankruptcy -0.019** -0.028 0.003 -0.005 0.011 0.005 
 (-2.112) (-1.213) (0.492) (-0.402) (1.122) (0.430)    
Public debt -0.298** -0.248* -0.025 -0.049 -0.105*** -0.080 
  (-2.183) (-1.795) (-0.638) (-1.262) (-3.207) (-1.565)      
Presence of other hedge funds 0.055 0.138*** -0.028 0.011 0.041 0.096 
 (0.978) (4.791) (-0.932) (0.592) (0.632) (1.566)    
Secured debt 0.018** -0.000 0.003 -0.009* -0.008 -0.017*** 
 (1.994) (-0.023) (0.807) (-1.904) (-1.270) (-3.218)    
Number of claimants 0.015** 0.021 -0.000 0.002 0.010*** 0.013** 
 (2.574) (1.283) (-0.040) (0.493) (3.349) (2.498)     
Time 0.008 0.035 0.001 0.061 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.347) (0.872) (0.011) (1.300) (-0.113) (0.246)     
Constant -0.974** -0.355*** -0.216 0.044 -0.626 -0.334 
 (-2.460) (-4.347) (-1.568) (0.170) (-1.564) (-1.479) 
Observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Wald test of indep. Eqs. (ρ=0)   
  Chi2 33.801*** 136.257*** 0.506 3.896*** 47.189*** 85.084*** 
 
 
